The Case For Reform Of The Tribunal System

Introduction

At a time when Kenyans are striving to reform the judiciary, among other institutions, to ensure greater access to justice for majority of the citizens, it is imperative that we examine how Tribunals have fared in resolving disputes either between citizens inter se or between citizens and government departments in Kenya. Tribunals normally address issues of administrative justice, which would otherwise end up for adjudication and resolution by the ordinary courts. To the extent that Tribunals are an important alternative forum to the regular courts for remedying citizen’s grievances and addressing administrative justice issues, it is important to evaluate how they have discharged their critical mandate.

Tribunals are now accepted as a fact of life. Virtually each new statute that Parliament enacts sets up a Tribunal of one type or another to consider applications for licenses, to enforce professional and ethical standards and discipline, to adjudicate on disputes arising from administration or application of the statute, etc. They enjoy obvious advantages over the regular courts, which make them quite appealing. To begin with, they are more accessible to a greater part of the population. Their proceedings are far much cheaper and speedier. They tend to apply simpler procedures, are less technical and have the ability to foster informal justice. More importantly, they have capacity to evolve specialisation and expertise in their field of jurisdiction.

These advantages notwithstanding, an examination of the various Tribunals existing in Kenya today will show an area mired in confusion and uncertainty. There exist many Tribunals each independent of the other, appointed and constituted differently, operating on different procedural rules and with different degrees of accountability. This raises fundamental questions whose answers must impact greatly on the ability of Tribunals to deliver justice to Kenyans.

Some of these questions include: Are our Tribunals part of the Government machinery, the judiciary or are they independent adjudicatory bodies? How are members of the Tribunals appointed? What are their terms of service and how are they removed from office? How independent and impartial are our Tribunals? How accountable, transparent, competent are they? Why are the decisions of some Tribunals final whilst others are appealable to other Tribunals or the High Court? Why do different Tribunals have different rules of procedure, some adopting procedures akin to those of regular courts whilst others are quite informal? Why do some Tribunals expressly allow representation by counsel whilst others are silent on the issue? How does this dichotomy impact on the ability of Kenyans to access justice and to what extent does our present tribunal system ensure or guarantee equal justice for all Kenyans? Is the present state of affairs desirable or should we adopt common standards and procedures for all Tribunals?

These are some of the issues that this paper attempts to address

 Tribunals: An Overview

Definition and Characteristics

The Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (the Franks Committee) in Britain defined Tribunals as “machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of administration” . The Franks Committee had been appointed in 1954 to address complaints about the operation of Tribunals in Britain. It reported in 1957 and among its key recommendations was that Tribunals were part of the adjudication machinery, which must operate independently of Government Departments. In this respect, the Committee observed:

“We consider that tribunals should properly be regarded as machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of administration. The essential point is that in all these cases Parliament has deliberately provided for a decision outside and independent of the Department concerned…and the intention of Parliament to provide for the independence of tribunals is clear and unmistaken.”

As part of the adjudication machinery, the Franks Committee further recommend that Tribunals must satisfy three fundamental principles of openness, fairness and impartiality:

“In the field of tribunals, openness appears to us to require the publicity of proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decisions; fairness to require the adoption of a clear procedure which enables parties to know their rights, to present their case fully and to know the case which they have to meet; and impartiality to require the freedom of tribunals from influence, real or apparent, of Departments concerned with the subject-matter of their decisions” .

There are many different types of tribunals in Kenya, as in many other Commonwealth countries. They exercise administrative or quasi-judicial powers. Some, such as the Kenya Board of Mental Health are purely regulatory and advisory. Others such as the Rent Tribunals adjudicate disputes between citizens. Yet others like the Income Tax Tribunals hear disputes between citizens and public bodies. Some like the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board register professional practitioners and exercise disciplinary control over them. Others, such as Liquor Licensing Tribunals have first instance jurisdiction to consider and approve applications for licences. Others such as the Agriculture Appeal Tribunal have only appellate jurisdiction from decisions of public officials or regulatory bodies.

Arising from the fundamental differences in Tribunals, the following have been identified as the general characteristics of Tribunals: -

1. they are statutory bodies
2. they are established to deal with particular types of cases or a number of closely related types of cases on a permanent basis as opposed to being set up for a one-off inquiry and do not have jurisdictions covering much wider range of subject matters like courts do.
3. they are independent of the administration and decide cases before them impartially
4. they reach binding decisions in the cases they hear
5. their decisions are usually made by a panel or bench of members rather than by a single adjudicator
6. members often do not serve full-time and are not professional judges or even lawyers
7. they adopt a procedure similar to, but more flexible and simpler than a court of law

Rationale

One of the reasons put forward to explain the phenomenon growth and expansion of Tribunals is the great degree of regulation of economic and social activities witnessed in the welfare state. As virtually every sphere of economic and social life was regulated by statute or subsidiary legislation – landlord and tenant relationships, agricultural production, land use, delivery of professional services, urban planning, licensing of businesses, betting, gaming and gambling, etc- Tribunals became an ideal tool for addressing disputes and other issues that arose from the regulation. These included, for example, determination of who is qualified for specified licences, who is entitled to practice certain professions, the manner in which discretion is exercised in making those decisions, etc.

Even with the privatisation of much of the public sector, the importance and number of tribunals have not diminished.

Advantages

The resilience of Tribunals is primarily attributable to their advantages over ordinary courts of law. Prof S A de Smith has enumerated the advantages of Tribunals in the following terms:-

“A tribunal may be preferred to an ordinary court because its members will have (or soon will acquire) specialised knowledge of the subject-matter, because it will be more informal in its trappings and procedure, because it may be better at finding facts, applying flexible standards and exercising discretionary powers, and because it may be cheaper, more accessible and more expeditious that the High Court. Occasionally dissatisfaction with the over-technical and allegedly unsympathetic approach of the Courts towards social welfare legislation has led to a transfer of their functions to special tribunals…”

The Franks Committee expressed itself in similar terms on the advantages of Tribunals. It noted as follows:-

“Tribunals have certain characteristics which often give them advantages over the courts. These are cheapness, accessibility, freedom from technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of their particular subject. It is no doubt because of these advantages that Parliament once it has decided that certain decisions ought not to be made by normal executive or departmental process, often entrusts them to tribunals rather than ordinary Courts” .

Over and above the advantages noted above, Tribunals have additional advantages. Frequently the issues at stake may have adverse effects on a citizen, and yet be not justiciable in the strict legal sense. The aggrieved citizen may not have locus standi in the matter in the strict legal sense. The conduct that has aggrieved a citizen may not strictly speaking amount to a violation of the law, or no judicial remedies may be available. In all these instances where an aggrieved citizen may not obtain assistance from the regular courts, the Tribunals offer an appealing alternative.

Tribunals in Kenya

It is generally agreed that in most Commonwealth states the growth of Tribunals has not occurred in accordance “with any great theory of administration”. Instead, tribunals have grown and continue to grow on ad hoc basis, to deal with specific problems in an area attracting regulation.

In Kenya the development of Tribunals has not been any different. Our Tribunals are set up on statute by statute basis without any common characteristics. On a conservative estimate, there are probably more than sixty Tribunals in existence in Kenya today.

An examination of some of these Tribunals discloses startling differences and variations. To begin with the nomenclature is inconsistent and compounding. Some are called “Tribunals” others “Boards” , others “Commissions” others “Committees” others “Authorities” others “Bureaus” others “Councils” , etc. This inconsistency in names is not a mere aberration; it mirrors greater inconsistencies in more fundamental issues touching on Tribunals which would otherwise demand standardization and consistency.

The Tribunals are all set up by different statutes . They are appointed and constituted differently. Some members of the same Tribunal are appointed by the President and the rest by the Minister . In other Tribunals, all the members are appointed by the Minister . The Minister appoints some members at his own discretion, others on the “advice” of, “consultation” with, or “nomination” by specified institutions. In yet other Tribunals the appointment is by different authorities such as the Chief Justice . Some members of Tribunals are elected by specified organisations or sectors . Members of different Tribunals enjoy different remuneration and terms of office. Members of some enjoy a measure of independence and security of tenure whist others serve at the pleasure and discretion of the Minister .

All these Tribunals exercise different powers. They operate on different procedural rules. Parties before some are allowed representation by Advocates whilst others are not. The decisions of some are final whilst those of others are appealable either to the Minister , to other Tribunals , to subordinate courts or to the High Court . Even in those Tribunals where appeals are allowed to the High Court, some are allowed only on questions of law , others on both questions of law and fact. In some Tribunals, the decision of the High Court on appeal is final whilst in others further appeals to the Court of Appeal are allowed . The right of appeal is exercisable within different periods, some within 14 days , others within 28 days , others within 30 days , others within 60 days and others within 90 days.

Amidst all this confused jungle of variations, we cannot possibly talk of equal justice before Tribunals, when some Tribunals operate as part of Government ministries and departments whilst others operate as independent quasi-judicial bodies, when some litigants have the advantage of counsel whilst other do not, when litigants before some Tribunals have the advantage of audience in an appellate Court, whilst others do not. It is time we considered standard procedures and practices before Tribunals as is happening in some Commonwealth jurisdiction.

 Some Random Examples

The following examples illustrate the great variation and differences in Kenyan Tribunals.

(i) The Teachers Service Appeal Tribunal

This Tribunal is set up under the Teachers Service Commission Act to hear appeals from persons denied registration as teachers or deregistered from the register of teachers by the Teachers Service Commission. It is made up a Chairperson and between 2 and 4 other members . All are appointed by the Minister without any consultation save for only one member who must be a registered teacher appointed in consultation with the organisation representing teachers.

The secretary is a public officer appointed by the Minister. The Minister also enjoys the power to “ appoint such other public officers to act as staff of the Tribunal as he may consider necessary” . The Tribunal has an assessor who is an advocate of not less than 5 years standing, appointed by the Tribunal with the approval of the Minister. The term of office is determined by the Minister but should not exceed three years, although it is renewable. The Minister determines the suitability of a member to continue in office and is empowered to declared the office vacant

The rules regulating the practice and procedure of the Tribunal are made by the Minister . Its proceedings are heard in private and an appellant before the Tribunal may only be represented by an Advocate with the leave of the Tribunal . Its decisions are final and not subject to appeal .

A casual examination of this Tribunal raises serious doubts about its independence, openness and fairness. The Minister assumes over it such prominent powers that it operates more like a government department rather than an independent adjudicatory mechanism. For a body whose decisions are final, it is difficult to see why representation by an advocate should be at the discretion of the Tribunal or more importantly why its proceedings must be held in camera. It is difficult to hold that such a Tribunal, purely from the way it is constituted fulfils the fundamental principles of openness, fairness and impartiality.

(ii) The Radiation Protection Board

This Tribunal is set up under the Radiation Protection Act . Its functions are regulatory and advisory. More importantly, it also licenses dealers in irradiating devices or radioactive material . It is made up of a maximum of ten members. The chair is appointed by the Minister without any consultation or any stipulated qualifications. Four members are civil servants appointed by the Minister on the nomination of other ministries. One member is appointed by the Minister on nomination by the National Council for Science and Technology and a maximum of two members are appointed by the Minister on account of their special knowledge in the safe handling of radiation sources. Two others, the Director of Medical services and the Chief Radiation Protection Officer are members by virtue of their offices in the civil service .

Decisions of the Board refusing, suspending or cancelling grant or renewal of licences are appealable to the Minister within 30 days and his decision is final . The Board is empowered to regulate its own procedure and no regulations have been made on the right to be heard before cancellation or suspension of the licence, the nature of the hearing and the right to representation by counsel.

Again, in this Board the overwhelming influence of the Minister is too plain to emphasise. He virtually appoints all the members of the Board, the great majority of whom are civil servants and hence an integral part of the government administration. The Minister’s influence over the Board is completed when he has to hear appeals from decision of his appointees.

(iii) Value Added Tax Appeals Tribunal

S. 32(1) of the Value Added Tax Act empowers Minister, by order published in the gazette to appoint an Appeals Tribunal for any area for purposes of hearing appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Value Added Tax. The Tribunal is made up of a chairperson and not less than two and not more than five other members all appointed by the Minister. They hold office “for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the Minister may determine” . The Act does not stipulate their qualifications.

The Act specifically confers upon the Tribunal the powers of a subordinate Court to summon witnesses, to take evidence upon oath or affirmation and to call for production of documents. If it deems fit, it may take affidavit evidence and administer interrogatories and may call for evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible in law. Parties have an express right to legal representation and the Tribunal is empowered to award costs in proceedings before it. There is a right of appeal to the High Court within 14 days of notification of the tribunal’s decision.

Whilst in this Tribunal the influence of the Minister in appointment of the members is clear, nevertheless this is mitigated by the express recognition the right to legal representation and a right of appeal to the High Court, which is not limited to questions of law only as is the case in some other Tribunals. Whilst the Tribunal enjoys powers akin to those of a Court of law, it is surprising that there is no requirement that any of its members should have legal knowledge.

(iv) Transport Licensing Appeals Tribunal

Created by the Transport Licensing Act , this Tribunal hears appeals from Transport Licensing Boards mandated to license motor vehicles and ships for hire or reward, trade or business or carriage of goods and passengers. It is made up of the chairperson and four other members. The chair is appointed by the President whilst the other members are appointed by the Minister . The members hold office “for such term and under such conditions as the Minister may determine .

An appeal has to be filed within 21 days from the date of the decision appealed against. The right of parties to be represented by advocates is expressly guaranteed and the decision of the Tribunal is final and conclusive .

(v) District Road Boards

These bodies are created by the Public Roads and Roads of Access Act to hear applications for construction of roads of access and to consider cancellation or alteration of roads of access. The Board is made up of five members appointed by the Minister for a term not exceeding two years renewable. It uses employees of the civil service to discharge its duties. Appeals by aggrieved parties are heard by a Subordinate Court of 1st Class sitting with two assessors. The Act is silent on the qualification of members of the Board or the right to legal representation before it.

(vi) Tourism Appeals Board

This Board is set up under the Tourist Industry Licensing Act to hear appeals by parties whose applications for licenses are refused or whose licenses are cancelled or varied. It is made up of three members, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry as the chairperson and two other members appointed by the Minister one of them having knowledge of the tourism industry. An aggrieved party has 14 days from the date of the decision to file a written statement of appeal. The Board considers and determines the appeal without hearing any of the parties , although it may call either party or witnesses if it considers it necessary.

Under this statute, the licensing officer responsible for issuance of licences is appointed by the Minister and his decision is appealable to a Board composed exclusively of the Minister’s appointees. Of greater concern is the value of an appeal where as a general rule the tribunal is required not to hear any of the parties.

(vii) Agricultural Appeals Tribunal

This Tribunal is constituted slightly differently from the others and illustrates an attempt to standardise appeals from various Boards. It set up under the Agriculture Act to hear appeals under that Act as well as from the Cotton Board of Kenya , the Kenya Dairy Board , the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya , the Coffee Board of Kenya , Tea Board of Kenya , the National Irrigation Board and the Pig Industry Board . The Tribunal is made up of three members, a chairman appointed by the Chief Justice, being of an Advocate of not less than seven years standing and two members with knowledge or experience in agriculture appointed by the Minister. Before assuming their offices the members are supposed to subscribe to an oath for due execution of office. Points of law are pronounced upon exclusively by the chairman who may state a case on a question of law for the opinion of the High Court. Otherwise the determination of the Tribunal is final and conclusive.

The Chairman with the approval of the Minister makes the rules of the Tribunal. In its proceedings the Tribunal is not bound by any rule of law on evidence save the rules made under the foregoing provision. Proceedings of the Tribunal take place in public.

For unfathomable reasons, appeals, where allowed under other statutes dealing with agricultural issues do not lie to the Agriculture Appeals Tribunal but to other separate Tribunals. Examples include appeals under the Seed Plants Varieties Act , Canning Crops Act , National cereals and Produce Board Act , the Sisal Industry Act and the Sugar Act .

(viii) The Auctioneers Licensing Board

This Tribunal is set up by the Auctioneers Act and is charged with exercising general supervision and control of the business and practice of auctioneers. In particular the Tribunal is responsible for licensing and disciplining auctioneers. Apart from its members being appointed differently from other Tribunals, it has a very large membership – seventeen - emphasising the great variations in Tribunals in Kenya. The majority of the members are appointed by the Chief Justice with the Minister playing no role at all. The Tribunal is made up of a chairperson appointed by the Chief Justice from among persons qualified for appointment as judge of the High Court or Court of Appeal, a Chief Magistrate also appointed by the Chief Justice, one representative of each of the eight provinces appointed by the Chief Justice, the Permanent Secretary responsible for provincial administration, two advocates of at least ten years standing nominated by the Law Society of Kenya, two auctioneers of not less than five years standing nominated by the National Association of Auctioneers and Court Brokers, one nominee of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry and one nominee of the Kenya Bankers Association . The secretary is a public officer also appointed by the Chief Justice .

The rules of procedure for the Tribunal are made by the Chief Justice . The Tribunals’ proceedings take place in public . The Act is silent on the right to legal representation but the Tribunal is supposed to maintain a record of its proceedings. A party aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal has a right of appeal to the High Court within 30 days of notification of the decision. The decision of the High court is final.

Reform of Tribunals Examples

Reform of Tribunals in the United Kingdom

We have already noted the work of the Franks Committee in the United Kingdom in the quest to reform Tribunals. As a result of the report of the Committee, various reforms were initiated to improve operations of Tribunals in UK.

Chief among these reforms was the enactment of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958. The Act created the Council on Tribunals as an advisory body with oversight over specified Tribunals and Inquiries. It was made up of lawyers and non lawyers, the latter being in the majority to ensure that “the guiding principles shall be the ordinary man’s sense of justice and fair play, freed so far as possible from legal technicality” . Its powers did not extend to appointing members of Tribunals but it was empowered to keep under review the constitution and working of the specified Tribunals and to report on any other question touching on Tribunals referred to it. It could make general recommendations on the membership of those Tribunals and more importantly, it had to be consulted before new procedural rules or regulations were made for the Tribunals. This was a big step towards standardization of Tribunals. Its annual reports are tabled in Parliament.

Another important change brought by the Act was the requirement that members of specified Tribunals be appointed by their ministries only from panels nominated by the Lord Chancellor and could not be terminated without the consent of the Lord Chancellor, who was constituted one of the Ministers responsible under the Act. The specified Tribunals became obligated to give reasons for their decisions if requested. In addition, the right of appeal to the High Court on points of law was guaranteed to the specified Tribunals and a power to bring other Tribunals under the Act by ministerial order was granted.

It has been noted that these reforms did go a long way in standardizing the work of tribunals, they not go as far as the Franks Committee had recommended. They did not for example allow appeals on questions of fact and merit, but restricted the right only to questions of law .

More recent steps have been taken in the United Kingdom to further reform Tribunals. In May 2000 the Lord Chancellor appointed a committee under Sir Andrew Leggatt inter alia to review the delivery of justice through Tribunals to ensure that they are fair, timely, proportionate and effective arrangements for handling disputes and further that performance standards of tribunals are coherent, consistent, public and with effective measures for monitoring and enforcing standards.

The Committee reported in March 2001 and made recommendations which sought to attain four main objectives. The first was to make the different tribunals into one Tribunal System, the second to render tribunals independent of their sponsoring ministries and departments through administration by one Tribunal Service, third to enhance the training of members of tribunals and lastly to enable unrepresented users to participate effectively in the Tribunal proceedings .

Reform of Tribunals in New Zealand

Similar recommendations have been made in New Zealand for Reform of Tribunals. In its March 2004 Report entitled Delivering Justice for All, The New Zealand Law Commission made recommendations for a unified tribunal framework entailing the rationalisation and integration of tribunals and their membership and processes.

The unified structure would have judicial leadership by being headed by a judge as President, with two legally qualified deputies. The system is expected to build up a core of experienced tribunal members who could sit in the various constituent tribunals, with others possessing particular skills and expertise in specific areas. It recommended further that “future Tribunals should be established only in accordance with principle and in conformity with fixed guidelines” and save in exceptional cases new ones should be integrated in the unified structure.

To ensure independence, all Tribunals in the unified structure would be administered by the Ministry of Justice. Appeals from the unified tribunals would to go to a panel made up the president or Deputy President, a member of the Tribunal in question and a member from another Tribunal. The appeal would be on matters of fact and/or law and a further appeal only by leave of the High court on a mater of law only.

Reform of Tribunals in Western Australia

Western Australia, a state within the Commonwealth of Australia has also in recent years made far-reaching proposals for reform its Tribunal System . The basic reform proposal is the establishment of a general administrative Tribunal to be known as the State Administrative Tribunal.

In March 2001 the Attorney General for Western Australia appointed a Task force to examine and develop a model of a civil and administrative tribunal for consideration by the Government. The Task Force was specifically requested to consider the structure of the tribunal, its scope or jurisdiction and its relationship with the Courts and other tribunals separate from it.

The Task Force submitted its report on the establishment of a State Administrative Tribunal in May 2002. It recommended among other things the establishment of a new State Administrative Tribunal to exercise original jurisdiction of many of the existing decision making boards and tribunals and to assume the administrative review functions of the various tribunals, ministerial and public officials and some of the courts. The Task Force enumerated various advantages of a generalised tribunal which would address structural deficiencies in the existing ad hoc system. These included:

1. access by citizens to a single one-stop tribunal instead of a variety of existing tribunals
2. an easily identifiable point of contact for all citizens on review of administrative decisions instead of the existing plethora of boards, tribunals, courts etc.
3. easily available information to citizens on making of applications, hearings and reasons for decisions
4. development of a more flexible and user friendly system
5. availability of a wide range of experts and experienced members serving in various panels
6. more effective and systematic recruitment and training of members of the Tribunal
7. original decision making and administrative review decision making would be conducted on a more cost effective basis
8. administrative review functions would be easily assigned to an existing and experienced tribunal instead of creating an ad hoc review body.

On the structure of the Tribunal, the Task Force recommended senior judicial leadership, with the President being a Supreme Court Judge and two Deputy Presidents being District Court judges. Other members were to have legal and other specified qualifications or experience so that the tribunal would have a membership of persons with judicial experience, general legal experience and special qualifications and experience relevant to the various areas of jurisdiction of the tribunal.

On powers, practice and procedure of the Tribunal it was recommended that the Tribunal should be guided by the need to advance the interests of the people, the right of the people to know the reasons for decisions, speedy and correct resolution of matters and the duty to act fairly in all proceedings. Specifically it was recommended that the Tribunal:

1. should be bound by the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness
2. should be unfettered by rules of evidence, practice and procedure applicable to courts
3. should conduct and determine proceedings with little formality and technicalities and with promptness
4. should regulate its own procedure.

Arising from these recommendations of the Task Force, the State Administrative Tribunal Bill 2003 was published seeking to implement the above recommendations.

Conclusion

This paper sought to undertake a general and preliminary examination of Tribunals in Kenya from their statutory framework. The inevitable conclusion is that Tribunals play a critical part in adjudication and resolution of disputes. They enjoy great advantages over regular courts of law which make them an important vehicle for delivering administrative justice. More importantly, due to their informality, simpler procedures and cheapness, Tribunals are better placed than regular courts to ensure that the majority of citizens access justice.

However in Kenya today Tribunals are incapable of delivering quality administrative justice to Kenyans. The plethora of tribunals is confusing and compounding even to the lawyer, let alone the ordinary Kenyan. Ironically, the whole justification of the Tribunal system is to enable citizens to access administrative justice easily, speedily, cheaply and fairly. The present system does not foster these core values of an administrative justice system. The Tribunals are constituted and operate as part of the administration whose decisions are normally called into question before them. They lack independence and impartiality. They enjoy wide discretion without adequate mechanisms for accountability, leading to great variations in decision making. So many fundamental differences defying rational justification exist between the Tribunals that the principle of equal access to justice is undermined.

A casual examination of developments in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia shows concerted efforts being undertaken to address similar concerns with Tribunals. The recommendations are against the proliferation of ad hoc Tribunals and the creation of a unified tribunal framework. Perhaps it is time that we took a hard and deeper look at our Tribunals than this paper is able to do at present.
One of the possible approaches is for the Attorney General to mandate the Kenya Law Reform Commission to undertake a thorough study of the Tribunal systems in Kenya with a view to making recommendations for reforming the same to ensure a measure of independence and impartiality, professionalism, standardisation, openness and efficiency. 

(Joash Dache is Secretary/CEO Kenya Law Reform Commission. He is a CPS (K) and an advocate of the High Court of Kenya)